While hoping that the ''uniqueness'' of the nuclear issue will make it possible to gain Russia's support, the Westerners are wondering about the degree to which the close interests that link Moscow and Teheran will carry weight in the negotiation opening on new sanctions to impose on Iran. In the joint press conference he gave on Tuesday [18 September] with Bernard Kouchner in Moscow, the Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, considered ''unacceptable'' the prospect of Iran equipping itself with the nuclear weapon. This reassuring statement of principle, which echoes assertions along the same lines by Vladimir Putin, seems to indicate a community of views between the West and Russia.
Yet the Westerners admit having some difficulty in grasping exactly what the Russian leaders think of the Iranian military nuclear issue. Are they as worried as people in Paris or Washington can be about the prospect of a nuclearization of Iran, or do they feel that ultimately this eventuality would not be so disastrous, as Jacques Chirac let slip when he was in power and which some articles in Russian papers seem to suggest? Have they above all decided to take maximum political advantage of their situation as key mediator? ''Recently, we often have the impression that Moscow is taking us for a ride,'' a puzzled French official confides.
Even if the Russian authorities in the past have played a constructive role by proposing, unsuccessfully, to their Iranian partner that it enrich its uranium in Russia, and even if they have joined the two Security Council resolutions in adopting sanctions and actively participated in the negotiations with Iran conducted by the six countries that have taken up the issue (the UK, Germany, France, Russia, China, the United States), the Europeans and Americans are forced to observe that Moscow today is opposed to the adoption of a third resolution aimed at toughening these sanctions after the two series of measures already taken by the UN Security Council in 2006 and early 2007.
There are objective reasons for this Russian hesitation, Quai d'Orsay [Foreign Ministry] sources emphasize to temper this concern. First of all Iraq. The Russians, burned by the American military intervention in Baghdad and the wave of destabilization it is causing, fear a repetition of Washington's interventionist temptation and take very seriously the announcements of possible strikes, a scenario they believe would lead to a major disorder in the Middle East from which they would suffer.

Two Besieged Fortresses
Moreover, as a close commercial partner of Iran to which it is linked by close business relations, Russia has much to lose from the application of harsh economic sanctions. Bilateral trade amounts to 2 billion dollars. Russia is also Iran's indispensable partner for its civil nuclear programme since it is the prime contractor in the construction of the Bushehr power plant, a contract that has earned Moscow 800 million dollars. Faced with what it considers the intrusion of the United States in the southern Caucasus, its traditional sphere of influence, Russia needs a Moscow-Yerevan-Teheran axis to block the Washington-Tbilisi-Baku axis. Its special relationship with the regime of the mullahs, even if it is mistrusted very strongly, is also fuelled by the shared feeling the two countries have of being besieged fortresses. Iran and Russia have a passionate and contradictory relationship with the West, which they see as both a mirror and a foil simultaneously. Their attitude ! towards time draws them closer together. ''These countries remain focused on the long term,'' not the haste that characterizes the behaviour of the Western democracies, and often this time ''plays in their favour,'' a diplomat emphasizes.
This context, geopolitical as much as psychological, weighs heavily in the balance of Russian concerns. Obsessed with flexing its muscles to the West, Russia is undoubtedly not unhappy at seeing this latter fall on its face for a while on the Iranian issue. ''Our hope is that Russia understands that it cannot play this game of haggling and tightrope walking for too long when nuclear proliferation is at stake,'' a French diplomat noted on Monday [24 September]. ''The Russians know this is a separate issue that cannot be put on the scales with the rest.''